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In April 2008, the kgosi1 of the Royal Bafokeng Nation 
(RBN) brought an application against the Minister 
of Land Affairs (as he then was) and the Registrar 
of Deeds for a declaration that all land registered ‘in 
trust’ for the Bafokeng be registered in the name of 
the RBN. In its application, the RBN described itself as 
an ‘association of persons forming an indigenous tribe 
under a kgosi or chief’ and a universitas personarum 
also deemed to be a traditional community in terms of 
the Traditional Leadership Governance Framework Act 
2003 (Act 41 of 2003, or the TLGFA). 
The case discussed here concerns judgement handed 
down by the North West High Court in Mafikeng 
on 12 December 2013, in an interim application 
challenging the RBN’s authority to litigate this matter 
on behalf of the community it purports to represent. 
This issue, I will argue, addresses a growing tension 
between the political authority of traditional leaders 
and the fundamental right of their ‘subjects’ to speak 
for themselves. It may be argued that the Mafikeng 
judgement represents an important step beyond 
the established frame of this discussion in the North 
West courts, namely, which representative traditional 
structure is the proper one, to a question as to the 
duty upon those structures to comply with customary 
requirements of broad consultation and consent. In 
the event, it demonstrates the potential substantive 
significance of a procedural formality such as 
regulated by Rule 7(1).2 
In this case note, I will first set out very briefly the 
history of land dispossession in pre-colonial, colonial 
This note discusses the judgement handed down by the North West High Court in Mafikeng in an interlocutory 
application in the matter of the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RNB) vs the Minister of Rural Development and Land 
Affairs and Others. The application was brought by several ‘sub’-communities under the jurisdiction of the 
RBN, challenging the latter’s authority to litigate on their behalf. This application relates to a growing tension 
between the political authority of traditional leaders and the fundamental right of their ‘subjects’ to speak for 
themselves. It may be argued that the judgement represents an important step beyond the established frame of 
this discussion in the North West courts, namely which representative traditional structure is the proper one, to 
a question as to the duty upon those structures to comply with customary requirements of broad consultation 
and consent. In the event, it demonstrates the potential substantive significance of a procedural formality such 
as regulated by Rule 7(1).
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and apartheid Transvaal as the context to the main 
application brought by the RBN. This history itself, 
however, is contested – as are the histories of 
countless ‘traditional communities’3 across South 
Africa. In these circumstances, I argue, the singular 
and uncontested authority of the traditional leader to 
speak on behalf of those under his or her jurisdiction 
translates into a monopoly over history. This would 
not have mattered as much if the democratisation 
of traditional communities and their leadership 
structures had been a success. In other words, who 
wields power and over whom may arguably have 
been less important if that power was contained and 
accountable. Unfortunately, the current statutory 
framework of traditional leadership has failed in that 
democratisation project, leaving the courts as the 
site of endless traditional power struggles. I briefly 
describe this failure in the second section.
But why does it matter?  
It matters, I argue, not only because history forms 
the basis not only of ownership of land and other 
resources, but also of authority. In the context of 
the latest commodity resource boom, which targets 
rural areas almost exclusively, it matters a great deal. 
To be recognised as the leader of a community is 
increasingly to be the one to decide over the fate 
of that community’s resources.4 In the context of 
growing tensions in the North West Province platinum 
belt, any mechanism that might allow affected 
community members to raise their voices effectively 
through formal legal processes must surely reduce 
the frustration that has led to the instances of violent 
protest that have become associated with the area. 
I then turn to a discussion of the main application of 
the RBN to have 61 farms transferred into its name, 
the opposition raised by several parties, and the 
interim Rule 7 application, which is the subject of 
this case note. I conclude by discussing the potential 
significance of the judgement for the issues set out 
here.
The relevant history of land 
dispossession in the Transvaal
The history of land dispossession in South Africa, 
while culminating in the coherent project of placing 
the vast majority of land (and other resources) in 
white hands, initially varied across provinces. I will 
only describe very briefly the origin of this project 
in the Transvaal, as it forms the context of the case 
under discussion, but the significance of a proper 
understanding of the history of dispossession – and 
of the formation of communities – echoes across the 
country.5 
We recently marked the centenary of the Natives 
Land Act 1913, which prohibited Africans from 
owning or renting land outside marked areas that 
constitute 8% of the total area of South Africa. 
While this initiated formal segregation, dramatic land 
dispossession started much earlier.
The legal expropriation of land began in the western 
Transvaal the moment the Voortrekkers arrived in 
1839.6 A Volksraad Resolution of 1853, for example, 
noted that land could be granted to ‘natives’ on 
condition of obedient behaviour – which tenure would 
lapse as soon as the obedience came into question.7  
In 1855, Volksraad Besluit 159 held that ‘all coloured 
persons’ would be excluded from burgher rights and 
therefore from the possession of immovable property 
in freehold. In these circumstances, a form of land 
buying through informal trusteeship of white owners 
emerged in the 1860s, one that eventually saw many 
local missionaries buy and hold land on behalf of 
black land-buying groups.8  
In 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone led the first British 
annexation of the Transvaal.9 Shepstone, it will be 
recalled, was the pioneer of indirect rule in the British 
Natal Colony. He believed that the selective use of 
indigenous political structures and institutions was 
an important strategy to counter instability in the 
colonised territories – and imported the same ideas 
into the Transvaal.10 
In line with this development, the Pretoria Convention 
of 1881 proclaimed that ‘all paramount chiefs, chiefs 
and natives of the Transvaal’ would be permitted 
to buy land. What this meant in practice was that 
blacks could only acquire title through a recognised 
chief who would act as ‘traditional custodian’ of the 
land. It further meant that a state authority, deemed 
appropriate, would in fact assume ‘trusteeship’ of 
the property on behalf of the African purchaser – 
the latter necessarily being a recognised chief.11  
Central to this regime was, on the one hand, the 
59SA Crime QuArterly No. 49 • SePtemBer 2014
racist notions of ownership as beyond the level of 
civilisation of black communities and, on the other, 
the entrenchment of recognised chiefs as key figures 
in the project of indirect rule.
Who is the community?
The role of traditional leaders in the advancement 
of the project of indirect rule has been analysed and 
discussed by historians and anthropologists.12 That 
discussion is beyond the parameters of this case 
note. My interest here is in the post-constitutional 
statutory framework of traditional leadership 
and, in particular, how the issues of community 
representation played out in the courts and the policy 
arena. 
The increasing significance of who represents the 
community and how it ties up with property and 
power is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in 
the 20-year life span of the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act.13 When the Act first came into force in 1994, it 
made no reference to traditional leaders whatsoever. 
Rather, it recognised the fluid nature of community 
boundaries by including ‘part of a community’ 
in the definition of community as claimant and 
understanding customary ownership as deriving from 
shared rules rather than jurisdictional boundaries. 
In 2014, when the Act was amended to re-open 
the land claims process,14 the rhetoric had shifted 
dramatically. It was now seen by many as a means 
for the traditional leader to claim all land that may 
have been dispossessed from anyone under his/her 
jurisdiction – and the flurry of announcements  from 
various traditional leaders of their intention to lodge 
massive land claims shortly after the re-opening thus 
came as no surprise. It had come to be accepted 
that all land under the jurisdiction of a traditional 
leader must be held by him (or, occasionally, her).15 
In fact, the North West legislature, in voting in favour 
of the amendment to the Act, noted as its sole 
reason for the vote ‘the importance of strengthening 
the institution of traditional leadership’. Gone was 
the notion of smaller groups within traditional 
communities having the right to choose whether 
to claim land as a family or a sub-group, or as a 
member of a greater traditional community. In its 
place we find the insistence that, as under colonial 
rule, members of traditional communities only ‘exist’ 
– and can claim rights – through their traditional 
leaders.
The increase in power of the traditional leaders 
led naturally to increasing contestation over the 
incumbents to that power. The TLGFA created a 
scheme whereby the boundaries and leadership 
positions recognised by the Bantu Authorities Act 
1951 would stay intact, but be ‘democratised’ and 
‘restored to its pre-colonial dignity’ through two 
mechanisms: on the one hand tribal authorities 
would become 40% elected structures,16 while, on 
the other, a commission would be set up to deal 
with any leadership disputes that arose after 1927, 
when successive colonial and apartheid governments 
manipulated traditional leadership recognition to 
further the segregationist project.17 The Commission 
on Traditional Leadership: Disputes and Claims (also 
discussed in this issue of SACQ by Jeff Peires) was 
supposedly an attempt to clarify history once and for 
all and re-establish the leaders whose legitimacy is 
sourced from custom rather than past political favour. 
Unfortunately, the Commission was fraught with 
difficulties, with every one of the handful of decisions 
made public already, the subject of litigation. 
Alongside the rise of the recognised leaders, history 
remains a pawn to be manipulated by those in power.
In an illustration of the contestations over both the 
leadership and their areas of jurisdiction, the lodging 
of disputes picked up so much speed over the last 
decade that a series of provincial commissions were 
constituted – and inundated. In Limpopo alone, over 
500 disputes were lodged by May 2012.18 To date, 
none has been settled in that province.
While there are many reasons why these disputes 
are important, including the issues of chiefly and 
headmanship salaries, the fact that the traditional 
leaders are increasingly allowed to speak on behalf 
of their communities about those communities’ 
resources, without any effective statutory requirement 
of proper community participation and consultation, 
is a significant cause. This is clear from the cases that 
have reached the courts – the majority emanating 
from the resource rich North West.
The Bapo-ba-Mogale community, next door 
neighbours of the RBN and the authority presiding 
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over Marikana, has seen various disputes relating to 
the authority to represent the community end up in 
court. In 2010, the kgosi attempted unsuccessfully 
to interdict 26 community members from calling 
meetings of the community.19 The Traditional 
Authority, in turn, successfully interdicted an 
individual who claimed to be the tribe’s CEO from 
representing the community in a different court on 
the same day.20 In 2011, the Traditional Authority 
unsuccessfully attempted to stop the election of a 
new representative structure.21 In 2012, the issue of 
who represents the Bapo community at the Marikana 
Commission of Enquiry also reached the High Court.
The third North West neighbour of litigious 
significance has been the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela. Kgosi 
Nyalala Pilane has obtained a number of interdicts 
against anyone in the community who seeks to call 
meetings of any inter-community structures without 
his consent. These judgements saw a growing 
tension between the High Court’s acceptance of 
the notion that within a traditional community, only 
structures recognised in terms of statute may act, 
represent or call meetings – and the pushback from 
community members who insist on their right to 
discuss the governance of their communities outside 
these structures.22 It was thus significant, when one 
of these matters reached the Constitutional Court in 
2012 in Pilane v Pilane,23  that the court set all three 
of the interdicts aside, although the minority dissent 
indicated a split in the court as to whether freedom 
of association and speech should outweigh the need 
to insulate the authority of traditional leadership. 
The majority insisted on the rights of community 
members and further indicated, quite significantly, 
that it believed the relationship of statutory traditional 
authority to customary leadership not recognised 
by legislation is ‘far from clear’; but refrained from 
pronouncing on it.24 
Royal Bafokeng Nation v Minister of 
Land Affairs and Others: the main 
application
In the main application launched in 2008, the RBN 
sought an order declaring it to be the owner of 61 
properties in North West. It alleged that the land was 
bought by the traditional community today known as 
the RBN between 1869 and 1963. It describes the 
land as the ancestral land of the RBN but ascribes 
the ownership thereof not ‘merely by occupation of 
the land historically by the Applicant as an indigenous 
community’, but to the acquisition of the land. All the 
relevant portions of land are currently still registered in 
the name of the government at the time of purchase. 
According to the title deeds, the government 
functionary holds the land ‘in trust’ for the chief 
acting on behalf of the Bafokeng Tribe.25 This came 
about as a result of the systematic barring of ‘natives’ 
from owning land through a series of colonial and 
apartheid policies, as described above. 
It should be noted that this application was brought in 
the context of the constitutional challenge launched 
against the Communal Land Rights Act 2006. That 
Act sought to transfer communal land held in trust 
by government functionaries back to communities, 
but was challenged by four communities on the 
very basis that it would weaken their tenure security 
by placing the authority over the land in the hands 
of traditional leaders. The Constitutional Court 
eventually scrapped the Act on procedural grounds 
in Tongoane,26 thus not entertaining the substantive 
objections and leaving it up to the RBN to continue 
pursuing a similar property formulation. 
The RBN sought this order on the grounds that 
the so-called trust regime created by the colonial 
and apartheid governments did not create a true 
trust relationship between the community and the 
government functionary and, in fact, the land is 
recognised as ‘owned’ by the community even if 
registered in terms of the old trust formula. If this 
is not the case and the land is, in fact, still held in 
trust by the government, then such a system is 
discriminatory and paternalistic and stands to be 
dismantled under a constitutional democracy.
At the time, the Minister requested the order sought 
to be published, to allow any interested parties to 
intervene. Subsequent to the publication, 13 parties, 
including families, communities and an association 
under the jurisdiction of the RBN, sought leave to 
intervene. Some opposed the relief sought in respect 
of specific properties to which they assert direct 
interest – alleging that the property was in fact bought 
by their ascendants and not by the ‘tribe’ – while 
others objected to the relief sought in respect of all 
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the affected properties. The RBN initially opposed 
the intervention, but it was eventually granted on an 
unopposed basis. The majority of the intervening 
parties were represented by the Legal Resources 
Centre and have come to be described in the papers 
as ‘the LRC clients’. 
After being admitted, the LRC clients filed their 
answering affidavits in the main application in April 
2011. They did not dispute that the system of 
state trusteeship had colonial and racist origins 
and is wholly inappropriate within a non-racial and 
democratic South Africa. However, they disputed 
the version of history and custom presented by 
the RBN, which would entitle the chief to hold 
the land on behalf of the entire community. They 
disagreed with the RBN’s contention that all the 
affected properties were purchased by the Bafokeng 
community and for the community, and alleged that, 
in fact, many of the properties were purchased by 
smaller syndicates for themselves and their children. 
They did not support an outcome that would see 
the kgosi having representative authority over their 
land and argued that, in the absence of a regulatory 
statutory framework for the governance of communal 
land, such a transfer would be premature. In any 
event, they argued that the Bafokeng kgosi and 
his council only have rights to the properties in 
terms of customary and common law in as far as 
the descendants of the original purchasers would 
consent thereto.
Closely related to that objection, the LRC clients 
raised the defence that the kgosi was not properly 
authorised by the community he purports to 
represent to bring the main application. The details of 
their objection are discussed below.
Instead of filing replying papers, the RBN applied 
for the matter to be referred to trial. It included the 
question as to whether it was authorised to institute 
the proceedings among a number of disputes of fact 
it identified. 
The LRC clients then brought an application in terms 
of Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules of Court for an order 
granting them leave to dispute the RBN attorneys’ 
authority to bring the main application, directing the 
RBN to prove its authority to bring that application 
and ordering that both the attorney and/or the 
RBN may not act further in the main proceedings 
unless and until such time as both had established 
their authority to the satisfaction of the court. That 
application was heard on 31 October 2013.
The Rule 7(1) judgement27 
Rule 7(1) provides that ‘the authority of anyone acting 
on behalf of a party may, within 10 days after it has 
come to the notice of a party that such a person is so 
acting, or with the leave of the court on good cause 
shown at any time before judgement, be disputed, 
whereafter such person may no longer act unless he 
satisfied the court that he is authorised so to act, and 
to enable him to do so the court may postpone the 
hearing of the action or application’.
While the Rules formerly required the filing of a 
power of attorney in specific instances as a rule, 
the substituted Rule 7 has, since 1988, meant that 
authority need generally not be shown in actions or 
applications,28 but may be challenged. While it was 
originally understood that Rule 7(1) only applies to 
the mandate given to attorneys,29 the SCA held in 
2005 that ‘the remedy for a respondent who wishes 
to challenge the authority of a person allegedly acting 
on behalf of the purported applicant is provided for in 
Rule 7(1)…’.30
The LRC clients first raised the opposition that the 
kgosi was not properly authorised by the Bafokeng 
traditional community in its answering affidavit in the 
main application. While the application was instituted 
in April 2008, the date of the resolution which the 
kgosi attached as authorisation was 22 September 
2005. That resolution was allegedly taken by the 
RBN at a Supreme Council meeting. However, the 
LRC clients contended, under custom the Supreme 
Council does not have the power to make such a 
decision, in any event not without thorough and 
broad consultation within the traditional community 
it represents. No such consultations occurred prior 
or subsequent to the resolution. Moreover, even if 
the resolution was properly taken, the LRC clients 
contended, it was overturned by a Kgotha-Kgothe31 
meeting of 29 July 2006, where general opposition to 
the idea that land should be transferred to the RBN 
was voiced by those in attendance. According to the 
LRC clients, ‘the Kgosi gave an undertaking at that 
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pitso that he would not pursue the matter before he 
had consulted further. He never consulted further in 
any meaningful way’.32 In terms of custom, the LRC 
clients contended, the kgosi may not go against 
the decisions of the Kgotha-Kgothe. The latter is 
‘the highest ranking decision making body of the 
traditional community’.33 
The LRC clients expected the RBN to respond to 
the allegations, but instead the RBN brought an 
application for the main application to be referred to 
trial. The RBN wanted the question of its authority to 
institute the proceedings to be dealt with as part of 
the main trial. 
The LRC clients insisted that it had to be dealt with 
as a separate and preliminary issue. They contended 
that Rule 7, in the circumstances, protected other 
fundamental interests. In these circumstances, 
these interests include the importance of ensuring 
compliance with traditional governance structures 
and practices that, in terms of customary law, ‘require 
widespread consultation, democratic decision 
making and full and thorough debate’,34 and the 
importance of avoiding situations where one part of 
the community with access to the financial resources 
of the community as a whole, litigates against 
another, less resourced part of the community.35 In 
addition, the issues ‘concern important questions of 
customary law that relate [to] governance systems 
and the ability of communities to hold their leaders 
[to] account’.36 
The RBN, in response, argued that the resolution 
of 22 September 2005 authorised the kgosi to 
institute proceedings to ensure that the registration of 
ownership of the 61 farms in question would reflect 
the RBN as owners. It is thus, so the argument goes, 
not a resolution that has the effect of land being 
disposed or huge financial liability being incurred. 
‘It is a resolution which in customary law does not 
therefore require the consent or consultation of each 
and every member of the Royal Bafokeng.’ 
It may be noted as an aside that an interesting 
dispute over the content of custom with regard 
to decision-making – and who may claim to have 
knowledge of the custom – ensues on the papers. 
Mr Rapoo, a member of the RBN who deposes 
to an affidavit on behalf of the LRC clients, bases 
his knowledge of the custom on his membership 
of the community. For the RBN, Mr van den Berg, 
their attorney, insists that he has knowledge of the 
requirements of the applicable customary law as he 
has had a long-standing professional relationship with 
the RBN. 
In its assessment of the arguments, the court listed 
the following principles to be applicable ‘where the 
authority of a signatory of an artificial legal person and 
its attorney is in dispute’:37 
•	 An	artificial	legal	persona	is	obliged	to	prove	that	it	
is authorised to initiate the litigation in question
•	 Any	challenge	should	be	mounted	in	terms	of	Rule	
7(1)
•	 Rule	7	can	be	invoked	at	any	time	before	judgement	
•	While	‘it	is	a	practical	rule	which	mostly	turns	out	to	
be compliance with a procedural formality’, it can, 
in some cases, impact substantively on the rights of 
litigants
On the issue of whether the LRC clients were able to 
show ‘good cause’, the court held that it included a 
‘satisfactory explanation for raising it at the time it is 
raised’; that prejudice to the other party must be taken 
into account; and that there must be the prospect for 
the objection to be a good one. Good cause would 
also require ‘some indication that prejudice [to the 
party alleging lack of authorisation] will be averted’.
Assessing the arguments before it, the court found 
that the question of authority was of such importance 
that it had to be resolved sooner rather than later. 
The LRC clients had shown their challenge to be a 
serious one and the RBN had not disputed that the 
issue of authority was one that had to be decided. 
In the circumstances, the purpose of the rule – to 
avoid the cluttering of pleadings on the one hand, but 
provide a safeguard to prevent a person from denying 
his authority for issuing the process on the other38 – 
would be served by granting the application.
The order granted refers three particular issues for oral 
evidence, namely:
•	 Did	the	Supreme	Council	of	the	RBN	take	a	
decision to authorise the bringing of this application 
on 22 September 2005?
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•	 Does	the	Supreme	Council	have	the	power	to	
take such a decision under customary law, and if 
so, is it necessary for it to consult broadly within 
the traditional community before taking such a 
decision?
•	Was	any	such	decision	overturned	or	reversed	
by subsequent events, and more particularly by 
the Kgotha-Kgothe meetings of the traditional 
community held in 2006?
In the circumstances, ‘the RBN and attorneys Fasken 
Martineau may not act further in the main application 
until the issue of their authorisation has been 
decided’.
Conclusion
The LRC clients, like hundreds of members of 
traditional communities who have approached 
the Leadership Dispute Commissions, dispute the 
accepted version of history that contains them 
within a certain jurisdictional boundary and under 
specified leadership. That struggle will continue for 
these communities. The significance of the Mafikeng 
High Court judgement in the Rule 7(1) application, 
however, is that it may diminish the importance of 
those contested boundaries and leaders: if traditional 
leaders are bound by the democratic principles of 
custom that require them to seek consent of their 
communities before taking decisions that would have 
an impact upon those communities, then the position 
of leader becomes a side issue.
It is interesting to note that the question of whether, 
and to what extent, traditional leaders should seek 
consent from their communities prior to decision-
making that would affect them, has a long history 
in pre-constitutional jurisprudence.39 Those cases 
invariably benefitted a despotic leadership. In fact, 
in a case in 190840 concerning the right of the 
predecessor of the current RBN kgosi over land, 
J Bristowe held that ‘it seems necessary, for that 
purpose [of self-preservation], that the chief should 
be an autocrat, that his will should be law …’.
The Mafikeng High Court may well have taken the 
first step in breaking a new post-constitutional path.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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